Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Second Amendment Litigant is Unlikely Handgun Advocate

Otis McDonald grew tired of the pattern of intimidation brought to bear upon him by some of the drug-dealing urban youth of his Chicagoland neighborhood.  At times, they would curse him and brandish their weapons just a few feet from his porch in Chicago's Morgan Park.  According to McDonald, some of these "punks" even threatened to "put him down."

Consequently, McDonald sought to even the odds by acquiring a gun, even if it meant he had to violate Chicago's anti-handgun ordinance to do it.

The 76-year old South-side Democrat, a retired grandfather and journeyman building engineer, who spent his career at the University of Chicago after serving in the military, is the petitioner in a case up for oral argument today at the United States Supreme Court.

An unlikely advocate for the right to "bear arms", at least in the organized sense, McDonald is not a card-carrying member of the NRA.  That group, however, will join him today in addressing the High Court and requesting that the handgun ban be struck down as unconstitutional.

This Blog has been tracking the case, as some of the high-crime issues underpinning Chicago's handgun ban are relevant to the communities of Southeast Michigan.  One of our earlier posts covered the lawyers arguing the case today.

There seems to be a consensus among legal professionals that Chicago's ordinance is likely to be declared unconstitutional.  Today, the City of Chicago, through it's retained Washington D.C. appellate lawyer, is expected to argue the safety interests such a ban serves in high-crime areas.

The consensus among High Court watchers that the handgun ordinance will be struck is based on the Court's recent decision striking-down a similar anti-gun law in the nation's capital.  The Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia vs Heller, however, does not apply to the states since it arose in the District.

There are many reasons Americans feel a deep-rooted sense of righteousness when it comes to our right to possess and carry firearms.  It's in our historic genes; our national tradition.  Otis McDonald, on the other hand, acquired his taste for the right to bear arms out of good old-fashioned necessity.  In order to feel safe in his own crime-ridden neighborhood and to protect his family from local thugs, he armed himself in transgression of Chicago's gun ordinance.

As a result, Law Professor Nicholas Johnson of Fordham University claims that Otis McDonald will be immortalized as a litigant in one of the rare cases that becomes common knowledge among our citizenry and stands for a single proposition; in this case, the right to bear arms.

Local Connection:  Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox joined the NRA in filing an amicus brief in Otis McDonald's case.

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Friday, February 26, 2010

Cooley Law School Stadium is a Minor League Ballpark

Thomas E. Brennan, former Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice, and the founder of Cooley Law School, was in Ann Arbor in October 1982 giving interviews to the Michigan Daily, and the now defunct Ann Arbor News as a Republican candidate for Lieutenant Governor.  It was the early-Regan era and I escorted Mr. Brennan through town as Dick Headlee's campus chairperson.

The former justice was asked by a reporter what he would do if Democrat James Blanchard moved into the Governor's Mansion.  Mr. Brennan paused as though the thought had never occurred to him, then said, "I'll go back to running the law school; we're developing an innovative curriculum at Cooley."

He was true to his vision.  There can be no doubt that Brennan developed the "business model" that is the Cooley Law School.  Cooley has tapped deeply into the American Dream, lawyer style.  As a result, it has enjoyed a healthy balance sheet, boasting one of the largest collections of law books in the country, pioneering the use of satellite "campuses", and swelling the ranks of its students to staggering proportions.

The law school dropped just under $1.5 million this week on it's first baseball park sponsorship; the former Oldsmobile Park inside the Capital Loop in Lansing.  The decision was met with mixed reviews from the law pundits and among the extensive network of Cooley Law Alumni.

Ashby Jones of the Wall Street Journal's law blog interviewed Cooley's dean, Don LeDuc, earlier this week about the sponsorship.  Dean LeDuc explained that the idea for the stadium came from past alumni-student gatherings at Tigers games in Comerica Park.  According to LeDuc, Cooley's stadium now allows them to bring the ball game to Lansing, so their students don't have to go so far.

LeDuc listed the advertising benefits of the sponsorship, sounding more like a marketing director than a law school dean.  In the blog interview, LeDuc admitted his was a revenue-driven operation with a multi-million dollar marketing budget.

The blog, Above the Law, was far less polite, calling out the mamoth law school (3500+ students) as a "diploma mill", and speculating that its graduates will be paying-off student loans with jobs at McDonalds.  The ATL blog critiqued the stadium sponsorship in a post that has attracted more than 150 comments; mostly negative.

A recent Cooley Law alumna admitted to me in confidence when discussing the ballpark sponsorship, "Cooley can't figure out whether it's a law school or a community college..."

The nation's largest law school does seem to attract its share of criticism.  It claims to be "ranked" as high as 12 on its own website, using its own criteria.  Most professionals not affiliated with the school, however, relegate it to "fourth-tier" status all day long.

All this raises the question: "Do we really need some 1200 new lawyers pumped into Michigan's service economy each and every year?"  Oakland County already has nearly 11,000 lawyers to Wayne County's 7000.

Over the past three decades, Thomas Brennan's law school business model has been a fiscal success.  Over those same years, I've come to know many a lawyer from Cooley with outstanding lawyering skills.  Former Michigan Governor John Engler is a Cooley graduate.

These days, however, I just have to wonder how many more lawyers we can take; whether or not they graduated from Cooley.  Brennan's vision of the American Dream has been tapped, but good.

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Sunday, February 21, 2010

No Joke: What's the Difference Between a Divorce and a Tatoo?

This blog post combines two posts from the SBM Blog and is the original content of the State Bar of Michigan.

As Michigan lawyers go about the work of convincing our state legislators that a tax on legal services would be a fundamental and costly mistake, we face the same response again and again:  "if we exempt one service we have to exempt them all."  In Georgia, policymakers are also gearing up for a tax on services, and a recent white paper from Georgia's venerable Tax Foundation asks: "Can anyone really keep a straight face while justifying a tax exemption for legal services, tattoos, haircuts, car repair,health club memberships and other common services?"  Well, we can.  In fact, we wonder how serious policymakers can keep a straight face equating legal services with personal grooming and adornment services.Bottom line: government shouldn't tax behavior that is good for society. We're all better off when people get the legal advice they need to secure justice or comply with the law.  Tatoos, not so much.

The original SBM Blog post, above, referenced a related post on the same subject, which is reproduced here for our readers convenient reference:

Unfair, Unwieldy, Unwise, Unethical, and Unconstitutional

The prospect of a Michigan tax on services that extends beyond the 26 services already taxed to include legal services is a growing threat, with a group of business leaders actively pushing the idea, legislation already introduced, and the Governor endorsing a services tax. The State Bar has successfully lobbied in the past against taxing legal services, arguing that a tax on legal services is unfair, unwieldy, unethical, unconstitutional, and, ultimately, unsuccessful. The constitutional problems with a tax on legal services are magnified when legal services to businesses are excluded, as is the case with several of the current proposals. See HB 5527, 5528, and 5529. If you haven’t expressed concern about a tax on legal services to your legislator, now’s the time.  Here’s how to connect.  Here’s the State Bar’s position.

Here's a quick rundown of the arguments.  A tax on legal services is...

Unfair – Most legal services are rendered in circumstances of crisis, stress, or misfortune. People who seek legal assistance in cases involving child support payments, child custody, divorce, death, domestic abuse, end-of-life decisions, or bankruptcy seek them out of necessity, not choice. For this reason, a tax on legal services is aptly labeled a  "misery tax".  



Unwieldy – Determining what fees and services would be subject to the tax and which records would or could be subject to audit would be an administrative nightmare. Among other reasons, attorneys often don't receive payment promptly from their clients, making it a potential administrative burden to reconcile payment with the tax obligation.  Administrative complications were one reason why the only two large states that have adopted such a tax – Florida and Massachusetts – repealed it shortly after it took effect. 
Unethical – Collection of a sales tax on legal services could compromise client confidentiality, imposing the state’s tax collection apparatus into the attorney-client relationship. Law firms do pay taxes under the Michigan Business Tax. 

Unwise – Individuals and businesses seek legal advice to ensure compliance with the law.  Such behavior should be encouraged, not taxed. Further, the tax could be counter-productive, causing clients to seek legal services outside Michigan for intellectual property, federal tax, estate planning, legal service, and encouraging law firms providing such services to relocate outside Michigan, or perform such services at satellite offices. Like medical services, legal services are not discretionary. Taxing legal services is taxing justice. 
Unconstitutional – In addition to constitutional concerns about attorney-client privilege and the taxation of criminal defense, the proposal to exempt one class of clients (business) from taxation while imposing the tax on another class (individuals) raises serious constitutional issues.

Unsuccessful - Two states, Florida and Massachusetts, enacted sales taxes on services but repealed the measures when they proved to be administratively difficult and unpopular.  In the three small states that are said to have a tax on legal services, two also tax physician services and the thrid reports that the tax is not enforced because it is so difficult to calculate and collect.


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Monday, February 15, 2010

UM Law School Challenges Constitutionality of Felony Child Support Statute

The mighty UM Law School has its hands all over the recent constitutional challenge to the felony child support statute.  The case was originally charged by UM Law Alumni and Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox.  The defendant-appellant in the case is represented by the Michigan Innocence Project, run out of the UM Law School by Professor David Moran.

The case, People vs Likine, was the subject of a one-day jury trial in the Oakland County Circuit Court back in November 2008.  Years earlier, Selesa Likine was ordered to pay child support for her three minor children pursuant to her divorce proceedings; also in Oakland County.  The criminal case against Likine charged that she fell behind on the support payments from 2005 through 2008, creating arrears in the amount of nearly fifty thousand dollars.

Ms Likine attempted to assert the defense of an "inability to pay" the support ordered by the family court.  She claimed disability via the Social Security Administration stemming from her diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder.  Likine also asserted that she was unemployed due to a lengthily hospitalization at the beginning of the charging period.  She further claimed that her support obligation was erroneously calculated by the family court, as it was based on a "phantom" imputed income of $5000 per month; a wage she claims she never earned in her entire life.

The felony child support statute is one of strict liability.  The Michigan Court of Appeals ruled in a 2004 published case (People v Adams) that a defendant cannot assert a defense at trial of his or her, "inability to pay" the court-ordered child support.

Accordingly, in the Likine case, the Attorney General requested trial judge John McDonald to preclude Likine from introducing any of the above facts regarding her disability and resulting lack of income from jury consideration.  The AG's motion was granted based on the Court of Appeals' Adams ruling.

Just prior to the beginning of her criminal trial, Likine's attorney moved for reconsideration of Judge McDonald's evidentiary ruling; this time arguing that precluding her from presenting evidence of her "ability to pay" and of her employment history, violated Likine's constitutional Due Process rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The motion was again denied.

Not surprisingly, Likine was convicted by the jury of failing to pay court-ordered child support and sentenced to one-year probation.  When the jury was deliberating her case, however, they sent out a note to Judge McDonald asking for information about Ms Likine's employment history.  Due to his earlier rulings in the case, Judge McDonald refused to answer the jury's query.

Following her jury trial, Likine secured appellate representation from UM's Professor Moran, who filed a motion for new trial; this time asserting that Likine's conviction violated the Michigan Constitution.  McDonald, stating that he sometimes disagreed with the Court of Appeals' Adams decision, nevertheless denied the motion.

In her appeal currently pending before the Michigan Court of Appeals, Likine relies on a Michigan Supreme  Court decision from 1889 which held that statutes cannot criminalize conduct which, through no fault of the defendant, is impossible to avoid.  Professor Moran asserts that such a criminal law lacks the requisite, "voluntary actus reus" (bad act).

Along the same lines, Professor Moran raises a claim of violation of federal Due Process under the U.S. Constitution.  In this fashion, Likine argues on appeal that the Court of Appeals' Adams decision wrongly eliminates the actus reus requirement of the felony child support statute, rendering it unconstitutional on its face.

In response, the Attorney General asserts that Adams remains controlling in felony child support convictions. The AG's argument is that the Michigan Constitution is not offended when a "prior judicial determination" establishes a payment obligation for which it is a crime to ignore.  Since Likine's support obligation was established by the family court, she was afforded Due Process.

In a somewhat surprising move given the high-powered counsel on both sides, the Court of Appeals has submitted the case to a 3-judge panel for decision without the benefit of oral argument.  The order to dispose of the case solely on the briefs was issued last week, despite both sides filing timely briefs which requested oral argument.

The losing side on this one will probably try to take the issue before the Michigan Supreme Court.

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Tuesday, February 9, 2010

City of Chicago hires Washington DC Solo Lawyer to Argue Second Amendment Case

Chicago's deputy corporation counsel in charge of appeals, Benna Solomon, has a schedule that is crowded with U.S. Supreme Court arguments.  So much so, she recently went beyond the city's law department to hire Washington DC solo appeals specialist James A. Feldman; a rare engagement, she says.

At stake is the oral argument scheduled before the high court on March 2 in the Second Amendment case of McDonald v City of Chicago.  The case, a subject of a prior Lawblogger post, tests a strict Chicago handgun ordinance in the context of the Second Amendment's applicability to the states via the Due Process clause.

The McDonald case has received much attention.  The Supreme Court's decision will be greatly anticipated by both opponents and proponents of the right to bear arms set forth in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The reason Chicago's Ms Solomon opted out of arguing the case herself is because she will be appearing in the Supreme Court the week before, to argue another case on behalf of the city.  She therefore looked to Feldman, who had done previous work with the city, and who's reputation as an experienced oral advocate at the highest level apparently preceded him.

Both Solomon and Feldman clerked at the high court for Supreme Court justices; Solomon with Justice Byron White, Feldman with Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.  Feldman also argued cases before the Court during his long tenure with the United States Solicitor General; the litigator for the United States Government.

Arguing on the other side will be Alan Gura, also of Washington DC, who won the District of Columbia vs Heller case on behalf of gun advocates.  Because it arose in the District, Heller involved federal gun laws and the decision striking down the gun ordinance therefore does not apply to the 50-states.  Gura will be sharing the podium, and his precious oral argument time with former U.S. Solicitor General Paul Clement, who will be arguing on behalf of the NRA.

Stay tuned for the decision on this one as it will affect how states can regulate our right to bear arms.

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Thursday, February 4, 2010

"Hillary Movie" the Vehicle for Unbound Corporate Political Ads

Last September, this blog noted that the 9 justices of the U.S. Supreme Court returned from their summer recess early to hear a rare re-argument in Citizens United vs Federal Election Commission; a case involving the limits of corporate spending on political campaigns.

In a 5-4 decision issued on January 21st, the high court ruled that corporations, unions and think tanks can spend as much money as they desire on political advertisements.  The majority in the case have interpreted the First Amendment's "free speech" clause broadly, perhaps dampening the Congressional trend over the past several decades in restricting corporate political donations.

Two days after the Court issued its opinion, President Obama, in his first State-of-the-Union address, blasted the High Court, claiming its Citizens decision would, "open the floodgates...[for corporations] to interfere with elections by running advertisements for or against candidates." The apparent fear is that such [now] unlimited corporate donations will drown out the voice of the common man in most elections.

The case involved federal regulation of the political documentary titled, "Hillary, The Movie", which took a critical look at the character and career of Ms Clinton back in her pre-presidential candidate days. The documentary was produced by a conservative advocacy group; Citizens United. The issue in the case arose when the group was denied permission from the FEC to distribute the short film via "on-demand" cable services.

The chief issue in the case concerned application of the McCain-Feingold law which bans the use of corporate money in elections. Some argue this restriction puts a stake in the heart of free speech; others assert that the ban is necessary to avoid a flood of corporate election funding which would corrupt and pollute our democratic process. The FEC banned the Clinton documentary on the basis it was produced, in part, with corporate profits. Direct corporate-funding of political campaigns has been banned for more than 100-years in America (Tillman Act 1907).

The Court's decision may not be as momentous as the President and other critics fear. First, direct contributions from a corporation to a political campaign are still restricted; complicated administrative regulations turn away some of the corporate ad men. Second, the decision opens the door for Congress to ban foreign firms from making contributions. The Supreme Court's decision also practically invites Congress to toughen rules on full-disclosure for corporate donations.

No doubt, Congress will take the bait, and no doubt, some corporations will eschew such disclosures and refrain from large disclosure-triggering contributions.

The Citizens United case has a Michigan connection in that it overturned a 1990 decision of the High Court, Austin vs Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which upheld restrictions on corporate spending in election campaigns.  Last month's Citizens decision will no doubt play a major role in the upcoming mid-term elections this summer and fall.

Here's an example, from California, of what such advertisments may look like.  I can hardly wait to see a billion dollars worth of political advertisements on my flatscreen, can you?

Update:  In reviewing my blog roll, I recently came across an excellent summary by blogger David Lat of a scholarly conference conducted at the Yale Law School that seemed to conclude that the effect of Citizens United will not be as profound as some, like President Obama, think...

Sunday, January 31, 2010

Oakland County's "Virtual" Work Release is Ready

This post is copied from and is the original content of the DUI Blog of drunk driving Attorney Patrick Barone.

The Oakland County Sheriff’s Office is scheduled to implement a new “virtual” work release program by early February, 2010. Virtual work release will consist of an ankle tether using a satellite and radio global positioning system (GPS) monitored by the Oakland County Sheriff. It will give the Sheriff’s Office the ability to carefully track an inmate’s location twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The radio technology will even allow a defendant to be tracked inside a home or workplace.

In preparing for the upcoming start date the Sheriff’s Office is meeting with the Oakland County judges to orient them to the virtual work release program. The Sheriff has already met with the Oakland County Circuit Court judges and will be meeting with the District Court Judges in early January.

The eligibility for the new program has not changed. Accordingly, a judge must authorize participation prior to enrollment in the virtual work release program and offenders sentenced on any CSC (Criminal Sexual Conduct) charge are not eligible. Also, there may be no outstanding warrants, holds, or unpaid bonds.

Eligible inmates will be referred to the Jail’s Program Services Unit for an interview. The inmates address will be verified, and they will be oriented to the program. Inmates must provide written documentation verifying employment/school. The vendor for the GPS tether will provide staff to install the tether and Sheriff’s Office Booking staff will process the release. Inmates will be placed on the GPS tether as soon as they have been screened for eligibility and orientated to the rules.

The GPS tether selected by the Oakland County Sheriff is cutting edge technology that will allow authorized individuals such as a judge, probation officer or deputy sheriff to track the defendant’s whereabouts via a password protected web site operated by the manufacturer G4S Justice Services, Inc. Tamper, equipment failure and violation alerts will be sent out by G4S according to Sheriff’s Office parameters.

While on work release the defendant will be subject to certain appropriate “exclusion zones,” and will be allowed to leave their home only for clearly and specifically defined and approved work or school purposes. Exclusion zone violations will typically involve a warrant being issued. The offender is then picked-up and will serve the balance of their sentence confined in jail.

According to the manufacturer’s web site “using a standard web browser from any computer, officers can view and exchange monitoring and tracking data for enrollment, curfew schedules, caseload reviews, agency reports and termination. This information is also stored and monitored by specially trained personnel at our monitoring centers.”

Furthermore, the G4S tether “does not require a base or docking station due to the ability of the device to determine the location from both GPS satellites and cellular phone towers. This enhanced dual monitoring feature allows reliable location tracking from a single device even in impaired environments where RF and GPS alone do not work. The device incorporates a cellular modem and communicates information to the monitoring center over the CDMA network.”

Oakland County Undersheriff Michael McCabe said that the new virtual work release is a child of the new economy. Everyone is looking for ways to cut expenses without cutting services, and the new work release program is a much less expensive way to incarcerate non-violent offenders.

There are also many benefits to the new program. For example, the defendant bears nearly all of the costs of incarceration including the costs associated with tether.

Also, in this very tough economy fewer non-violent offenders will lose their jobs because there is almost no delay between the date of sentencing and the date the offender is actually back at work. With the old program this delay was as much as five to seven days. Now the delay is as short as one to two days tops. There is also no limit to the number of offenders that can be on the program at any one time.

Furthermore, violent offenders are not eligible to participate, and public safety will be further enhanced through random drug and alcohol testing conducted through the Sheriff’s Office Results Program.

As a consequence of these changes and improvements, offenders will be better able to pay back their fines and costs, including restitution and costs of prosecution. Additional savings may come in more defendants deciding to forgo trial in favor of a plea of guilty. When a defendant realizes that they will be able to keep their job and even stay at home during non-work hours the incentive to go to trial is significantly lessened. This will undoubtedly save the costs associated with trial for those individuals who know they are guilty but could not plead guilty for fear of losing their job, their car or even their home.

For all of these reasons, nearly all of the judges have been very receptive to and even excited about the new program. According to Undersheriff McCabe only a small minority have expressed reservations. He expects many of these reservations to diminish once the new program becomes better know and its benefits more fully realized by the participants.

Beginning in January 2010 the “old” non-virtual work release program will be phased out. Inmates sentenced to the old work release will be required to complete their sentence. Their sentencing judge will be contacted for approval to convert the sentence to a tether custody Work Release. If granted, the inmate will be placed out on tether. If not, the inmate will complete their sentence in the Work Release facility. However, there will be an effective date set whereby after that date all Work Release sentences will be a tether sentence. Only inmates finishing up an old Work Release sentence that a judge did not approve tether will be housed in the Work Release Facility.

Monday, January 25, 2010

What's In A Name? Detroit Injury Lawyer Sues His Own Firm

Detroit personal injury lawyer Lawrence Charfoos has sued his former law firm, Charfoos & Christensen PC, in the Oakland County Circuit Court.

In his complaint against the firm he helped build, Charfoos seeks injunctive relief to prevent the continued use of his well-known name, as well as money damages for fees he claims are owed.  The case was filed on Friday and assigned to Judge Wendy Potts.

Since 1991, the personal injury firm has owned and occupied the historic Hecker-Smiley Mansion on Woodward Avenue, pictured above.  The law firm has represented personal injury clients since 1929, when Charfoos' father hung a shingle in Detroit.

In the 1970s, Charfoos, having followed his father's footsteps, gained prominence for winning a series of multi-million dollar jury verdicts in product liability and medical malpractice lawsuits.  According to pleadings filed in the case, Charfoos teamed-up in the late 1970s with his now-former partners, David Christensen, and Dennis Archer.  When Archer left the firm to accept an appointment to the Michigan Supreme Court in 1986, the official name became Charfoos & Christensen, PC.

Under this name, one of the firm's partners, J. Douglas Peters, co-authored a widely-used practice manual on birth trauma cases featured in monthly full-page advertisements in the Michigan Bar Journal over the past several decades.  Christensen's name is also associated with the book, along with the name of the firm.

Last fall, Charfoos announced to his partners that he was leaving the firm that he helped build in his own name. Crain's Detroit Business reported in October 2009 that the firm's name would not change despite their founder's sudden departure.

Apparently, the Detroit personal injury lawyer has now teamed-up with former Wayne County Circuit Court Chief Judge William Giovan and immigration attorney Robert Birach.  The problem arises now that the group of well-seasoned attorneys has announced the name of their new firm:  Charfoos, Giovan & Birach LLP.  Thus for the time being, two Detroit-area law firms bear Charfoos' good name; hence his lawsuit.

In addition to Charfoos' litigation, there are also ethical considerations for the Christensen firm to consider.  The name of the firm cannot mislead the public.  With two law firms bearing the Charfoos name, the public is understandably confused, if not misled.  Simply click on the links in this blog post to see for yourself.

What's in a name?  Stay tuned to find out how valuable a well-known name can be...

Saturday, January 16, 2010

Supreme Court and the NFL: Court Examines the Business of Football

With play-offs now underway, the National Football League also is involved in litigation over how it can license NFL team logos. The case, American Needle v NFL, is in federal court and has gone all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Following oral argument last week, it was painfully clear that the nine justices on the high court do not spend much time watching football; not necessarily a bad thing. High court observers believe the Supreme Court may remand the case back to the federal district court in Chicago to clarify the issues in the suit.

The dispute arose in 2004 when the league switched companies, from American Needle to Reebok, granting the latter a non- exclusive apparel license to sell hats, jerseys and other apparel. The NFL has had a history of utilizing only one company at a time relative to apparel production. Until 2004, American Needle had the contract.

The issue on appeal is whether the NFL (and the 32-teams making up the league) is a “single entity” under the Sherman Antitrust Act, and therefore immune from that Act’s ban on monopoly-style pricing. American Needle asserts the NFL’s move to Reebok violates the anti-trust law because it is a network of separate business entities (individual teams) that have conspired to stifle competition and raise prices.

Both the trial court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the league in ruling that the NFL was a “single entity” that could forge exclusive licensing deals, regardless of the effect on pricing.

Implications for the high court’s ultimate decision have less to do with headwear than with how the league could treat players’ unions and how other leagues can leverage their power as a “single entity” over their respective players. Both the NBA and the NHL have filed amicus briefs in the case.

While the nine justices may not be aware of what is at stake for teams like the New Orleans Saints and the Indianapolis Colts this weekend, at oral argument they seemed to suggest the adoption of a “rule-of-reason” inquiry, whereby each specific anti-trust challenge is tested in court. Of course, the NFL would prefer a bright line, outright immunity that would spare it the expense of future lawsuits.

The high court’s decision on the case is expected shortly. While most NFL fans will be oblivious to the outcome of the litigation, they will purchase hundreds of thousands of caps and jerseys this month and next.

Update:  05/24/2010 - As SCOTUS winds down its session, it decided American Needle v NFL in a 9-0 decision against the NFL.  Here are some links to immediate analysis of the decision from the Los Angeles Times and the SCOTUS Blog.

Thursday, January 14, 2010

What are they Smoking?

This post is the original content of The Michigan Lawyer which is the official blog of Michigan Lawyers Weekly:

What are they smoking?  That’s what Detroit-based Cannabis Counsel lawyer Matthew Abel is asking of the Michigan Senate Judiciary Committee, who is meeting next week to discuss a package of bills which would amend the public health code so that medical marijuana must be dispensed by pharmacists, and to classify medical marijuana as a schedule 2 controlled substance.

“It seems that if the legislature ever passed these bills, they would be in conflict with the medical marijuana statute,” Abel said. “So they’d need a 3/4 vote to supercede the law, and you know that they can’t even get 3/4 of the legislature to agree on lunch, let alone this.”

Southfield-based lawyer Michael Komorn, who also serves as the treasurer for the Michigan Medical Marijuana Association, said the bills are similar to bills introduced last year; last year, the bills which also would have allowed for 10 marijuana growing facilities to be affiliated with a pharmacy, got no traction.

This year’s incarnation of the bills would essentially make all production of medical marijuana illegal, though use would still be protected by law, Komorn said.

“It’s like the stamp act, arcane and without any understanding of what really is going on with patient needs,” Komorn said. “Bottom line, this is an attempt ot repeal the Michigan medical marijuana act.”

It’s impossible, Abel said, to require dispensing of medical marijuana through pharmacies.

“They don’t have a supply, and no way to get it. There’s just no way for them to do it,” Abel said.

Still, he’s resting easy with the idea that the bills are going nowhere, and are really more about grandstanding for political popularity than they are about the Michigan medical marijuana law.

The committee will take up the bills Jan. 19, 1 p.m., in room 210 in the Farnum building in Lansing.
__________________________

Law Blogger Note: The Michigan Medical Marijuana Act is the subject of a post in the electronic criminal lawyer blog.

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Sunday, January 3, 2010

2009 Michigan Child Custody Update

This post summarizes some of the more interesting 2009 family law decisions from the Michigan Court of Appeals dealing with child custody.

In 2009, the Court of Appeals looked at the interplay between the juvenile code and the child custody act in two important cases.  The first case discussed was published and thus binding precedent; the second case is unpublished and does not bind subsequent courts in Michigan.

In a case from Wayne County, In the Matter of A.P., Mother had sole custody of her child from a paternity action.  She was accused of abusing the child.  The resulting juvenile proceedings re-introduced the child’s biological father into the child’s life.  In the lengthily proceedings, the juvenile court’s rulings intersected and conflicted with prior orders from the family court.

The Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court supersedes the family court:

Once a juvenile court assumes jurisdiction over a child and the child becomes a ward of the court under the juvenile code, the juvenile court’s orders supersede all previous orders, including custody orders entered by another court, even if inconsistent or contradictory. In other words, the previous custody orders affecting the minor become dormant, in a metaphoric sense, during the pendency of the juvenile proceedings, but when the juvenile court dismisses its jurisdiction over the child, all those previous custody orders continue to remain in full force and effect. 
 DHS v Gunther is significant as it also addresses jurisdiction via the juvenile code over children that are already under the jurisdiction of the family court.  In this case, Mother had “physical custody” of the parties’ children resulting from a divorce judgment.

The Gunther children came to the attention of DHS due to school truancy allegations resulting in temporary placement of the children with their father.  Mother moved for their immediate return, asserting that the juvenile court referee could not alter the children’s “established custodial environment” without first conducting a hearing, as required by the Child Custody Act.

Again, the Court of Appeals held that once a juvenile court assumes jurisdiction over a minor pursuant to the juvenile code, the juvenile court’s orders supersede all other previous orders; including those issued from a family court.

In Pobanz v Pobanz, the Court of Appeals decided the issue of whether a 17-year old could be court-ordered to participate in parenting time within the context of a custody challenge.  As in the two other cases discussed in this post, Pobanz also featured a co-occurring neglect petition in the juvenile court. 

The trial court stated that it would not force a 17-year to participate in parenting time when she stated that she did not want to see her Father.  Although the Pobanz panel agreed with the trial court that a seventeen year old’s reasonable custody preference is given wide-deference, it held that the lower court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the many other statutory factors supported the decision.  The case was sent back to the Huron County Family Court to conduct the hearing.

Surprisingly, the Court of Appeals allowed the trial court to change judges based on the subsequent juvenile case.  The family court judge was first assigned to the Pobanz family in the divorce proceedings, but the trial court transferred the divorce, and Father’s custody motion, to the judge presiding over the subsequent juvenile proceedings.

This ruling is interesting in that it seems to violate the “one family, one judge” concept set forth in 1996 with the creation of the family courts across the state.  According to the reorganization statute, multiple cases involving the same family were all to be assigned to the first judge in the county assigned to that family.

In Bonner v Bonner, the Court of Appeals decided the issue of whether a child could be compelled to testify at hearing on his parents’ competing change of custody motions.  The case featured the open-court testimony of the parties’ minor child, limited to matters of alleged abuse by the Mother.

The case is most interesting for featuring the testimony of a well-respected psychologist that had observed the parties and child at the court hearing(s).  The psychologist then provided testimony to the family court as to his observations of both parents and the child.  Note: The family court judge did not find the child’s testimony about the conditions of his Mother’s home to be credible.

Also, the case is significant in that a child was compelled to testify in order to satisfy his parents’ right to due process.  Unlike in camera testimony of children called into a judge’s chambers to express their custodial preference under seal, this case featured the open-court testimony of a son against his own Mother.

Next, the Court of Appeals, in Roguska v Roguska, examined whether a family court could reject a settlement agreement on custody reached at court-ordered mediation by both parties and their respective attorneys.  In that case, the Mother subsequently attested that her husband lied during mediation, that she and her husband had serious communication problems, and that she subsequently obtained a PPO against the husband.

The Roguska panel held that such facts freed the family court from having to follow the settlement agreement on the custody issue.  In cases of domestic violence, arbitration and mediation are allowed, but disfavored due to the coercion that can sometimes be brought to bear against the victim of abuse.

The case of Hoeve v Hoeve continues the series of Court of Appeals decisions holding that the parents' school-district decision may be, by itself, proper cause to change custody.  In Hoeve, the pre-school child spent week-on-week-off with mom and dad.  Father sought and was awarded sole physical custody, however, once the child became eligible for kindergarten.

The parents lived about 70-miles apart.  Father's motion to acquire sole physical custody succeeded at trial and was affirmed on appeal.

According to family law appellate attorney Scott Bassett, the Hoeve case suggests that parental school choice disputes is the "new frontier" in child custody litigation.

This is a summary of what came out of the Court of Appeals on matters of custody in 2009.  Many other decisions addressed the important issues of domicile and parenting time which will be addressed in future posts.

Only time will tell what 2010 will bring.

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Sunday, December 20, 2009

Lab Techs Required to Provide In-Court Testimony, For Now

Last year, I prepared and argued a series of appeals for a man convicted in Washtenaw County of sexual assualts near Eastern Michigan University.  He received life sentences in six separate cases.

The primary issue in each case was identification.  Due to the way the victims were raped, they never saw their attacker's face.  Condoms and other precautions minimized physical evidence left at the respective crime scenes.

In one of the cases, however, Washtenaw County Sheriff detectives were able to recover a small semen sample.  The Michigan State Police crime lab contracted with an out-of-state forensic laboratory that produced a report concluding the sample matched the defendant's DNA.

At defendant's trial, the Washtenaw County Prosecutor called the MSP lab tech and the out-of-state lab tech to testify about the matching DNA.  On appeal, I argued that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated because the out-of-state lab tech relied on procedures and internal reports created from other technicians that were not present in court to testify.

Defendant's convictions were affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals and his petitions for writs of certiorari to the Michigan Supreme Court were denied last summer.  Around the same time, however, the United States Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz -v- Massachusetts.

In the Melendez-Diaz case, Suffolk County, Massachusetts law enforcement utilized lab "affidavits" concluding that a seized substance was cocaine.  The Supreme Court held that such an affidavit was insufficient to convict and that the lab technician must testify in open court.

In the few short months since the Melendez decision, law enforcement and prosecutors have raised an outcry about the increased costs and difficult logistics associated with producing the in-court testimony of lab techs.  The defense bar, on the other hand, has hailed the decision as a victory for individual constitutional rights.

In a rare move, the U.S. Supreme Court has scheduled oral arguments for January 2010 in Briscoe -v- Virginia; a case raising the same issue the high court so recently decided in Melendez-Diaz.  The New York Times has speculated that Briscoe will not overturn but rather, simply explain and clarify the Court's earlier ruling on lab technicians.  One such procedure would be to make lab technicians available for cross-examination rather than requiring their testimony in the prosecutor's case-in-chief.

At this date, my client is left with only a series of federal court habeas corpus petitions based on the Sixth Amendment.  Although his state-court remedies have been exhausted, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, discussed above, will have a significant impact on his habeas petitions soon to be pending in federal court.

The slightly increased cost to the state of securing the in-court testimony of all the lab techs that worked on his DNA sample is a small price to pay for our collective constitutional liberties.

The goal of a criminal defense at trial is to force the government to prove the elements of their case.  The goal of all criminal appellate representation is to ensure that the defendant's trial and sentencing were fair. Without these safeguards, our Sixth Amendment right to counsel is meaningless.

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Monday, December 14, 2009

Judges Cannot "Friend" Lawyers Via Social Media Says Florida Supreme Court


A few of my Facebook friends are judges.  They've taken a low profile on the news feed.  Will Michigan's Judicial Tenure Commission, formed in 1968 via constitutional amendment, seek to outlaw such social network connections like the State of Florida?

In Florida, the Supreme Court's Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee issued a 11/17/2009 decision, holding that judges may not connect with attorneys on Facebook, or similar social networking media.  The Committee's decision is based on a Florida's judicial canon prohibiting the appearance that a lawyer, or anyone else, is in a special position to influence the judge.

Floridian judges, however, remain free to post comments to their non-lawyer "friends", and can develop "fan pages" to help with their reelection campaigns.  Only the attorney-judge connection is now taboo in Florida.
The Ethics Advisory Committee stated that, "judges cannot isolate themselves entirely from the real world and cannot be expected to avoid all friendships outside of their judicial responsibilities, some restrictions upon a judge’s conduct are inherent in the office."


Ethics are catching-up slowly with attorneys and judges in the web 2.0 world.  Some states, like Louisiana, New York, and now Florida, have taken a restrictive view of lawyer's and judge's permissible activities on such sites.  


Linked-In, Twitter, and Facebook remain available to our judges.  You can expect Michigan's never shy Judicial Tenure Commission to address the situation as soon as the right case rolls around.  Shouldn't be too long... Stay tuned.


info@clarkstonlegal.com


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Sunday, December 13, 2009

Washtenaw County Guardianship Spotlights Problematic Surrogate Arrangements


A recent Washtenaw County Probate matter received national attention over the weekend by appearing on the front page of the Sunday NYT, in an "above-the-fold" article by Stephanie Saul.  The guardianship case involved a surrogacy contract between a Kent County couple and the surrogate mother from Ypsilanti.

Amy Kehoe and her husband contracted with both egg and sperm donors, then arranged for Laschell Baker to serve as the gestational surrogate.  The Grand Rapids couple located Baker from the surromomsonline web site.  The would-be parents also contracted for services with IVF Michigan, a fertility clinic.

Neither the Kehoes nor Ms. Baker had any legally recognized biologic connection to the babies; twins born in July.  The babies spent their first month with their would-be parents, the Kehoes, but were then removed by the surrogate's successful probate petition for temporary guardianship.

Problems arose when the Kehoes appeared in the Washtenaw Probate Court for the agreed upon guardianship transfer from the surrogate to the Kehoes.  According to the NYT, Mr. Kehoe disclosed at the hearing that his wife had been treated for a mental disorder. 

In Michigan, the Surrogate Parenting Act prohibits contracts for gestational surrogacy services in exchange for fees as void on public policy grounds.  In addition, surrogacy for profit is a five-year felony.  The Act does not create parental rights for would-be parents who arrange for the creation of a baby.

In 1992, the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the Act in the case of John Doe -v- Michigan Attorney General, holding:
As overwhelmingly repugnant as the thought may be, unbridled surrogacy for profit could encourage the treatment of babies as commodities. Whatever sense of idealism that may motivate a fertile woman into hosting a pregnancy for an infertile couple is rent asunder by the introduction of the profit motive. It could be only a matter of time before desirable, healthy babies would come to be “viewed quantitatively, as merchandise that can be acquired, at market or discount rates.” O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 NCLR 127, 144 (1986). As the New Jersey Supreme Court commented in In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 440, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988): “In a civilized society, there are some things that money should not be able to buy.” In our opinion, babies ought to be one of those things.
Ohio's Ninth Appellate District, in J.F. -v- D.B., 116 Ohio St 3rd 363 (2007), discussed but declined to follow the Michigan Court of Appeal's Doe case.   To date, only California allows enforcement of surrogacy contracts where the inchoate parents have no biological connection to the baby.

In the Washtenaw County case, the surrogate mother denies there was a commercial surrogacy contract, claiming she carried the twins gratutiously, only seeking reimbursement for her medical expenses.  Ms. Kehoe disputes this, blames Michigan's poor laws on this subject, and views Ms. Baker as a child-thief.

The Washtenaw Probate case draws attention to the lack of laws or guidelines relating to custody issues for children born under such circumstances.  In this case, although neither set of competing parents had a biological connection to the child, although neither set of parents filed for adoption, the surrogate was awarded custody.  

Ms. Kehoe has stated that her health issues are under control, but can no longer afford a sustained legal challenge to the surrogate's petition for guardianship of the twins.  She also claims that lawyers have advised her that custody of the twins is unlikely.  For her part, Ms Baker asserts that she never would have agreed to be the gestational carrier had she known about Kehoe's mental health history.

The case begs the question: does a surrogate mother have parental rights superior to those of a would-be parent that contracts for the creation of an infant?  Intermediate appellate review of the Washtenaw Probate Court, or perhaps some different procedural maneuvers, could have improved Kehoe's chances for temporary guardianship and possible custody.

This issue is sure to surface repeatedly in the context of gay couples, as the battle over gay marriage is waged on a state-by-state basis.  More gay couples want to complete their families with children of their own.  Surrogacy and adoption are the primary means to this end.  For an excellent introduction on the subject of gay surrogacy agreements, view this NYT video clip.  The American Bar Association, offering assistance to state legislatures and family court judges, has published a Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology.

Updates: The NYT's Ms. Saul stays on the case, reporting on a decision issued in the New Jersey surrogacy case over the holidays.  The New Jersey family court judge ruled that the gestational surrogate was the "legal mother" thus, she had the right to challenge custody of the twin girls she delivered in 2007.  Also see Nathan Koppel's posting on the case in the WSJ's Law Blog.  Stay tuned on this one, as the trial is scheduled for this spring.

With the 21st Century marching forward, some of our more traditional institutions, i.e. "family" and "marriage", are coming under pressure to evolve; to become more inclusive and less exclusive.  Litigated surrogacy contracts are but one marker in this social evolution.

What will the definition of "Mother" be at the end of this new decade?

More Updates: Check out local Detroit WDIV television's coverage of the Washtenaw County surrogate twins case on Sun. January 10, 2010.

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Saturday, December 12, 2009

Congress vs NCAA


As the holidays approach, college football fans once again work up their annual lather over how to end the season, and crown a national champion; or not.

Last year was controversial.  This year features two undefeated teams (Boise State and TCU) that have no chance of playing each other under the present Bowl Championship Series.  So now, our Congress is getting involved?

This week, Joe Barton, (R-Texas) introduced a bill that would proscribe the promotion, marketing, or advertising of any post-season Division I college football game as a "championship" unless it is the final game of a single-elimination tournament.  Good luck with that.

One criticism of the proposed legislation is that it may violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  While commercial speech may be closely scrutinized to prohibit untruthful or misleading messages, regular speech has the full protection of the First Amendment.

Some of you may be wondering, what is the government interest protected by this proposed bill?  Should Congress be discussing and debating college football?  Will President Obama sign it into law?

Perhaps we should simply put this down as another fine "slice of life" in the workings of our Democracy.  Besides, the annual debate among professional sports writers over who's best in football adds spice to the holiday season.

Sunday, December 6, 2009

Supreme Court Makes Getting Your Day in Federal Court Much More Difficult


The case of Ashcroft -v- Iqal involved the aftermath of the 9-11 terrorist attacks in 2001.  The case is quickly becoming known, however, for placing significant procedural hurdles in the way of a litigant's access to federal court.

Justice Anthony Kennedy, left, wrote the 5-4 opinion for the high court, published last May.

The case was brought by federal detainees held, and allegedly abused, in make-shift detention centers in the Bronx shortly following the attacks on the World Trade Center. 
Javaid Iqball and other detainees filed suit in the United States District Court in New York City against former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and former FBI Director Robert Mueller. 

Unlike most cases, the plaintiffs in Iqbal had the benefit of over 100 depositions prior to filing their suit.  Thus, the initial complaint has many pages of detailed allegations. 

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a complaint must contain, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the Supreme Court has ruled in earlier cases that Rule 8 does require sufficient factual allegations, assumed to be true, that state a claim that is "plausible on its face."

Ashcroft and Mueller asserted their official acts were cloaked with "qualified immunity" and moved to dismiss the suit. The federal trial judge in Manhattan, in denying the FRCP 8 motion for summary judgment, held Iqbal's detailed allegations of abuse were sufficient to survive dismissal. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, rejecting a heightened pleading standard in a well-reasoned 92-page opinion, concluding:
Nevertheless, as a result of the Supreme Court’s precedents interpreting Rule 8(a), it is possible that the incumbent Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a former Attorney General of the United States will have to submit to discovery, and possibly to a jury trial, regarding Iqbal’s claims. If so, these officials -FBI Director Robert Mueller and former Attorney General John Ashcroft -may be required to comply with inherently onerous discovery requests probing, inter alia, their possible knowledge of actions taken by subordinates at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Bureau of Prisons at a time when Ashcroft and Mueller were trying to cope with a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit's rationale, reversing the intermediate appellate court's decision. Many legal professionals now fear that Iqbal's failure to state a claim will be the blue print for federal judges to routinely prune their dockets of all-manner of plaintiff's claims.

In reversing the Second Circuit, Justice Kennedy's opinion stated:
Iqbal’s pleadings do not comply with Rule 8... Several of his allegations—that petitioners agreed to subject him to harsh conditions as a matter of policy, solely on account of discriminatory factors and for no legitimate penological interest; that Ashcroft was that policy’s “principal architect”; and that Mueller was “instrumental” in its adoption and execution—are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true. Moreover, the factual allegations that the FBI, under Mueller, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men, and that he and Ashcroft approved the detention policy, do not plausibly suggest that petitioners purposefully discriminated on prohibited grounds. Given that the September 11 attacks were perpetrated by Arab Muslims, it is not surprising that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the policy’s purpose was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. Even if the complaint’s well-pleaded facts gave rise to a plausible inference that Iqbal’s arrest was the result of unconstitutional discrimination, that inference alone would not entitle him to relief: His claims against petitioners rest solely on their ostensible policy of holding detainees categorized as “of high interest,” but the complaint does not contain facts plausibly showing that their policy was based on discriminatory factors.
In the 18-months since the Iqbal decision, the case has attracted the attention, and ire, of many legal professionals fearful this precedent will block access to federal court. In particular, plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination now face a higher hurdle at the pleading stage.

Case in point: last month the Senate Judiciary Committee grilled the former U.S. Solicitor General (the government's litigator) about the case. The Democratic senators complained that the case will prevent legitimate cases from seeing the light of day in federal court.

Michigan Connection: U.S. Representative John Conyers has co-sponsored a bill seeking to re-write FRCP 8(a) such that litigants bringing their claims will not face sure dismissal based on the high court's Iqbal decision. Stay tuned.

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Saturday, December 5, 2009

Second Amendment May Gain Some Ground

Nearly a decade post-9/11, the forgotten amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Second Amendment's right to bear arms, may gain some ground here at the beginning of the 21st Century.  Several state attempts to erode this right have been subjected to successful constitutional challenges.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Robert Ord -v- District of Columbia, reversed a trial court's dismissal of one such gun owner's challenge, remanding the case back to the lower court for further proceedings.

Robert Ord, a licensed investigator, also licensed to carry a weapon in Virginia, will now be able to develop his case; a case that asserts that the mere threat of prosecution in nearby District of Columbia, where he frequently works, constitutes damages.  One interesting aspect of this case is that Ord was never arrested, nor were his weapons seized.  He claims the objectionable government action was the issuance of a warrant; a warrant Ord claims was obtained by the police in bad faith.

This spring (March 2010), the United States Supreme Court will hear oral argument in a gun-ordinance case from Illinois, McDonald -v- Chicago.   Michigan's Attorney General recently filed an amicus brief in the case.  In the Chicago gun case, the issue for determination by the Supreme Court is whether the Second Amendment is incorporated (thus applicable) to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause such that Chicago's gun-ordinance banning guns in private homes is unconstitutional. 

A good primer on this age-old issue can be found on the official blog of the U.S. Supreme Court; known as SCOTUS.  The high court's blog post surveys the historical context of the Second Amendment with a focus on the modern ordinances and state laws that attempt to limit gun possession due to it's correlation with violent crime.

The high-court petitioner(s) in these gun cases are citizens claiming a constitutionally-protected right to bear arms. They assert that the state cannot unreasonably restrict this right with its laws or ordinances.

These cases pit the power of the government against the fundamental liberty interests of the individual.  The tension between the two continues to be the glue of our Democracy, just as it was in colonial times when these concepts were debated in Philadelphia, Boston and Washington.

In the decade since 9/11, various powers of the federal government have expanded under President Bush. At the state level, however, the individual right to bear arms may hold ground. The McDonald and the Ord cases are crucial milestones for the highly revered Second Amendment.

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Thursday, November 12, 2009

U.S. Supreme Court to Decide Juvenile Lifer Cases from Florida



On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two consolidated cases from Florida involving life sentences for juvenile offenders: Graham v Florida and Sullivan v Florida. What makes these cases interesting, and thus important, is that the victims in the cases were not killed, yet the offenders received life sentences without parole. A published decision will follow soon.

Here in Michigan, pursuant to a network of statutes, a juvenile may be tried as an adult. Michigan also has a variety of offenses which call for life sentences. There are no juvenile offenders, however, serving life sentences for non-leathal offenses in Michigan.

The question before the Supreme Court this week was whether a life sentence should be flat-out banned for non-lethal juvenile offenders. Chief Justice Roberts seemed to be lobbying his fellow-justices to provide the juvenile offender the opportunity to emphasize his "youth" under an 8th Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" analysis. Roberts' approach was an alternative to the outright ban sought by the attorneys for the youths. He seemed to favor a "proportionality" analysis.

Full analysis of Justice Roberts' approach to the argument in this case is found on the SCOTUS blog.

There are about 100 such youth sitting in prisons on life sentences for non-lethal convictions; most of them in Florida, which has approximately three quarters. A recent NYT article suggests that tourism in the state may have been a factor in so many harsh sentences handed down to youths committing serious crimes in Florida.

Professional court watchers sensed sympathy for the youthful convicts from some of the Justices. A few seemed to favor a constitutional prohibition of such sentences. The rationale for the ban is cruel and unusual punishment. A secondary argument is that such youthful offenders could benefit from habilitation.

Other (more conservative) Justices seemed less sympathetic, wondering where the age line should be drawn.

Without a clear majority on this issue, our prediction is that the court will decide the case down ideological lines, resulting in a plurality decision (i.e. no clear majority in the opinion, with several justices writing separately from their colleagues).

The case also calls into question the age-old tension between states' rights to define their own criminal laws in accord with local mores and sentiments, and the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all citizens, regardless of the criminal code of the state in which they are convicted.

We will await the high court's decision and keep you posted on the result along with some of the other cases we are following. In the meantime, if a juvenile member of your family has been accused of a serious crime, contact our firm to discuss your options.

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Two Day Jury Trial in Oakland Circuit Results in Not Guilty Verdict


Just before the holiday, I heard the words that a defense attorney craves; "not guilty". I was in a two-day jury trial before Oakland County Circuit Judge John McDonald. I think he's a great judge, mostly because I've never lost a trial in his courtroom. This one made four straight.

The odds seemed stacked against acquittal, as usual. The principal charge was assault with intent to do great bodily harm (less than murder). The second count, commission of a felony with a firearm, carried a mandatory two-year minimum prison sentence upon conviction.

My client was a middle-aged woman with no criminal record. The alleged victim, however, had done 15-years in prison for armed robbery. After an evening of drinking and socializing, the two (in an on-again off-again relationship) retreated to my client's home. An argument boiled over and two shots were fired from a revolver. One shot hit the victim in the foot.

At trial, my client took the stand and testified she shot the weapon toward the "victim" in self defense. The jury believed her, and she avoided the two-year mandatory prison sentence.

One of the keys to the acquittal was effective cross-examination of the so-called victim. He was made to look foolish, admitting to contact with and agression toward my client.

The case illustrates how the tough plea policies of the Oakland County Prosecutor's office can sometimes force a jury trial.  In this case, the client was most concerned about doing two years in prison. She could appreciate the seriousness of the gun shots, and the significant injury one of the bullets did to her former boyfriend. Willing to do some jail time on an assault guilty plea, she could not bring herself to sign-up for two years in prison. But that's what the prosecutor wanted her to do.  They did not offer to drop the felony-firearm charge.

So the defendant rolled the bones and exercised her right to trial. In this case, it was worth the effort. This client saved two years of her life.

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Wednesday, November 4, 2009

Child Support Reduction & Collection Requests Flood Friend of Court


The pain is inflicted on both sides of the fence in family court cases across the state.  For those paying child support, and for its recipients, the depressed economy in Southeast Michigan is taking a toll.   

As a recent article in the Detroit News makes clear, the Friend of the Court in counties accross Michigan are scrambling to field the flood of requests filed to reduce child support, or to enforce an existing support order.  Most of the parents seeking a support reduction are doing so because they've either lost their job or have been handed a pay-cut.

Child support in Michigan is calculated using an algorithmic equation known as the Michigan Child Support Formula.  This formula is based on three main inputs: the payor's income, the recipient's income, and the number of overnight parenting sessions for the payor.  A payor's support obligation is modifiable if there is a "change in circumstance" to justify the request.  One such justification is when a payor, through no fault of his own, loses a job or suffers a significant decline in income. 

In difficult economic times, county Friends of the Court (the administrative arm of the family court) experience an increase in the volume of motions from payor's and custodial parents alike, seeking relief from the financial pain.  In the case of a payor, the support automatically deducted from his paycheck may exceed more than half of his take-home, especially when that "take home" is an unemployment check.  Across town, the custodial parent is used to receiving a certain amount of support to help make ends meet for the children.

When a party files a motion to modify his or her support, the matter is reviewed by a Friend of the Court Referee (a quasi-judicial official) before it goes to the family court judge.  Most FOC Referees utilize support specialists; professionals trained in the application of the child support formula.  The court rules provide for the Referee to make a recommendation to the judge regarding whether the payor's support should be reduced or not.

Each November, as the year-end approaches, parties realize there are only a few weeks left to get their matter heard before the courts shut down for the holidays.  Many scramble to file motions, hoping they can obtain some financial relief.  Wanting to save money, they forego hiring an attorney.  When a party files a motion on their own behalf, however, it can take quite a long time before the FOC grants them a hearing.

One advantage to hiring legal counsel is that the attorney knows how to get a client's motion on the dockett by the end of the year.  In addition, family law attorneys know the many angles and tricky aspects of the support formula, and how to apply that formula to a variety of compensation packages and parenting schedules.

According to the Detroit News, child support arrearages rose by approxiamtely $113 million from 2005 to 2008, although the number of support payors decreased.  These support arrears are expected to increase as unemployed payors lose their state benefits.  The situation has attracted the attention of Congress, which is proposing legislation designed to extend unemployment benefits for child support payors.

If you or a family member need relief from an acute child support situation, contact our law firm for immediate relief.  Our firm handles dozens of such cases throughout the year.  Our service is excellent and our fees reasonable.

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