Stop and Frisk in Gotham

By:  Timothy P. Flynn

When a police officer has good reason to stop someone on the street to ask a basic question like, "what is your name?" or, "what are you doing?", he has a right not to receive a bullet for an answer.  In some places in our country, here in the 313 or, say, Gotham, police are often viewed as the enemy, especially by the thugs on the streets patrolled by those officers.

Police officers are trained to identify and stop crime.  Their training and experience translates into certain tactics used on the streets in the course of their daily job duties.

One such tactic endorsed by the SCOTUS 45-years ago, in a case called Terry vs Ohio, is the "stop-and-frisk".  A stop-and-frisk is where a police officer with a "particularized suspicion" [something less than probable cause] that a person may be involved in criminal conduct, can stop the person  -briefly detain the individual- in order to ask them some basic questions.

In the process of stopping the individual and asking some basic questions, the officer may pat down the outer clothing of the individual in order to ensure no weapons are present and to facilitate the safety of the officer, the stopped individual, and innocent bystanders.  Think Sheriff Andy Williams strolling through Mayberry.

In theory, this pat down search must be brief and minimally intrusive, limited to the outer clothing of the individual; it cannot be a search for evidence.  How a particular officer conducts a basic pat down search says a lot about his personality; where a pat down search takes place is a huge factor in whether there will be trouble, or not.

On the mean streets of NYC, like here in the "D", officers have their hands full.  Routine stop-and-frisks can become a full-on fleeing, eluding and shooting in a matter of seconds.

In recent years, much grumbling has percolated up from the streets of Gotham due to the manner in which the NYPD handles its stop-and-frisk maneuvers.  The NYPD has been criticized for using racial profiling techniques in the prosecution of this law enforcement tactic.

In turn, this has led to a recent series of strident rulings by a federal judge in Manhattan.  Judge Shira A. Scheindlin has ordered sweeping changes to the NYPD, including a suspension of the stop-and-frisk policy as well as the appointment of a monitor for the department.

These rulings have been appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by the legal department of the outgoing Bloomberg administration.  Last month, the Second Circuit stayed Judge Scheindlin's rulings pending resolution of the appeal.

Of course, nothing ever being simple in Gotham, Judge Scheindlin put her thumb print all over these cases through a questionable maneuver to steer all the "stop-and-frisk" cases into her courtroom, and by granting media interviews about the cases while they were still being prosecuted in her Manhattan courtroom.

Now, however, some City bureaucratic leaders, and law-enforcement oriented folk, fear that the new administration of mayor-elect Bill de Blasio will withdraw the City's appeals of Judge Scheindlin's so-called anti-NYPD rulings.  NYC is the only entity with standing to appeal the rulings.

We shall see how these cases turn out in Manhattan.  While there could be some implication for all big-city police departments, here in Detroit, the DPD has a host of other problems distinct from how they conduct their stops and frisks.

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Posted in: Bill de Blasio,Detroit,Judge Shira Scheindlin,NYC,police,stop and frisk,Terry v Ohio

Appeals Court Creates New Crime to Affirm Conviction

This case, State v Helen, arose out of North Carolina.  The facts, on the surface, were about as favorable as it gets for the prosecutor.

The accused had a tail light out.  [If I had a dime for every defendant I represented who was pulled over for a tail light...]  The officer stopped the motorist; the stop led to a search of his vehicle and, eventually, a drug conviction.

Here is the problem that arose on appeal: in North Carolina, there is a little known wrinkle in their motor vehicle code which provides that, so long as a motorist's other tail light is functioning, having one light out is not a violation.

This case went all the way to the North Carolina Supreme Court.  Now, if I was sitting on that High Court, my vote would be to reverse the conviction.  If the officer lacked probable cause to conduct a traffic stop, then basic Fourth Amendment constitutional law provides that the evidence seized in an illegal stop and search is excluded as the proverbial "fruit of the poisonous tree".

A constitutional "no-brainer", right?  Guess again.  The divided High Court essentially created a new traffic law by holding that, so long as the officer held a reasonable belief that a law had been broken, the search was legal.

But citizens, take note that this "reasonably-held-belief" standard does not work both ways.  If you, the motorist, reasonably believe that you are obeying the traffic laws, [say you are texting in a municipality where you believe no distraction ordinance has been adopted], but in fact, you are violating a provision of the traffic code, then your ignorance of this law is no defense and you can get a ticket.

The "take away" from this case from North Carolina is that ignorance of the law is ok if you are a peace officer, but not if you are an ordinary citizen.

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Posted in: criminal defense lawyer,Fourth Amendment,law enforcement,police,pretext search,search and seizure

SCOTUS Tilts Miranda Warnings Toward Police in Case From Southfield

In January 2000, Van Chester Thompkins of Southfield committed a drive-by style shooting, killing one victim and wounding another.  He was convicted by an Oakland County Jury in May 2002 of first degree murder, assault, and a variety of weapons charges.

The case was initially assigned to now-retired Judge Richard Kuhn and subsequently re-assigned to Judge Michael Warren. Thompkins was represented at trial by West Bloomfield attorney, Lawrence Kaluzny.

From these local beginnings, this case went all the way to the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS).

Thompkins was apprehended in Columbus, Ohio nearly a year after the shooting and questioned extensively by Southfield PD detectives.  During his custodial interrogation, the suspect refused to answer the detectives' questions for several hours.

Nearly three-hours into the mostly one-way interrogation, the following exchange occurred:

     Detective:  "Do you believe in God?"

     Thompkins:  "Yes."

     Detective:  "Do you pray to God?"

     Thompkins:  "Yes."

     Detective:  "Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that poor boy down?"

     Thompkins:  "Yes."

Kaluzny's motion to suppress this statement was denied by the trial judge.  On the basis of this one-word confession, the jury convicted Thompkins, who is doing a life sentence in Coldwater, MI.

The conviction was appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals and affirmed in an unpublished opinion issued in February 2004.  Detroit appellate attorney Elizabeth Jacobs challenged the lower court's rulings on the motions to suppress Thompkins' statement and to suppress defendant's identification by the surviving shooting victim.  Jacobs also raised issues of trial misconduct by the Oakland County Prosecutor, claiming that Kaluzny's failure to raise the issue below rendered Thompkins' legal representation constitutionally deficient.

The intermediate appellate court disposed of Jacobs' argument on the suppression issue with the following ruling:

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police. Defendant asserts that the police improperly continued to interrogate him after he “implicitly” invoked his right to remain silent by failing to answer the officers’ questions. We disagree.

The record discloses that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and, according to the interrogating officer, verbally acknowledged that he understood those rights. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the record does not demonstrate that defendant asserted his right to remain silent. Although defendant refused to sign the advice of rights form, he continued to talk with the officer, albeit sporadically. He answered questions with brief responses, or by nodding his head, but never said he did not want to talk or that he was not going to say anything. “When a defendant speaks after receiving Miranda warnings, a momentary pause or even a failure to answer a question will not be construed as an affirmative invocation by the defendant of a right to remain silent.” The trial court did not clearly err in concluding that defendant voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and that he did not subsequently invoke his right to silence. Defendant’s statements were properly admitted into evidence.

The Michigan Supreme Court declined Defendant's invitation to further review his case.

Once a convicted defendant exhausts all avenues of appeal in a state court, that defendant can avail himself of the federal courts via a petition for habeas corpus.  Thompkins habeas petition was denied in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (in Detroit).

In a remarkable opinion from the United States 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, Thompkins' conviction was reversed.  The federal appellate court was unimpressed with the above analysis from it's Michigan counterpart; inferring that their unpublished opinion was weak on judicial application of significant precedent.  The federal appellate court also believed the state appellate court got the facts of Thompkins' interrogation wrong.

The 6th Circuit relied on the prior and seminal SCOTUS decisions of Miranda v Arizona and North Carolina v Butler, which establish an accused individual's right to remain silent, and imposes a "heavy burden" on the state to demonstrate that a suspect, once advised of this right, has waived his privilege against self-incrimination.

In reversing the 6th Circuit, the SCOTUS held that by answering "yes" to the detective's questions about God, Thompkins gave an "implied" waiver of his rights and further, that from now on, defendants must expressly and unambiguously state their intent to remain silent to their interrogators.  Also, police are no longer required to obtain written waivers executed by a defendant.

The case provides a slight advantage to police interrogators in that they can now continue to question a suspect until he affirmatively asserts his Miranda rights.  In the police interrogation context, many people are simply not inclined to do so thus, our Miranda rights may have less meaning under the hot lights of persistent, aggressive and skillful police interrogation.

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Posted in: Elizabeth Jacobs,habeas corpus,Judge Michael Warren,Judge Richard Kuhn,Lawrence Kaluzny,Miranda,Oakland County Prosecutor,police,SCOTUS