Michigan Court of Appeals Rules State Clerk Must Testify in DWLS Cases

In a 2-1 decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals recently ruled that a certificate mailed to a state driver, notifying him of his suspended license, is "testimonial" as that term is used in the constitution thus, the Secretary of State must produce it's clerk at a trial for driving on a suspended license.

The case, People v Nunley, arose in a district court in Washtenaw County.  The prosecutor attempted to introduce notice of the defendant's suspension, without calling a clerk from the Secretary of State's office to lay the proper foundation for the entry of that key document.

Both the district court and the circuit court denied the prosecutor's request to admit the document of suspension; a key element in any DWLS case.

The Court of Appeals panel reasoned that because the prosecutor must establish that the motorist received notice as an element of the crime, it held that introduction of the actual notice document, without producing the necessary foundational witness, violated the accused's right under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to confront and cross examine all witnesses.

In a well-reasoned 7-page dissent, Presiding Judge Henry Saad concluded that the notice was not "testimonial" under the analysis of seminal U.S. Supreme Court caselaw.  Judge Saad characterized the notice as merely "administrative" and emphasized that, when the notice was sent to Mr. Nunley, no crime had yet been committed [i.e. Nunley had yet to drive on his newly suspended license].  As such, the notice could not be testimonial in nature.

The result of this decision is that the prosecutor must now secure the appearance of the state clerk from Lansing in order to obtain a DWLS conviction.  Should the administrative costs of securing a conviction alter the analysis of the accused's constitutional right to confrontation of witnesses?  We think not.

The Washtenaw County Prosecutor has promised further appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.

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Posted in: 6th Amendment,confrontation clause,driving while license suspended,DWLS,Henry Saad,Michigan Court of Appeals,People v Nunley,Secretary of State,Terry Nunley

SCOTUS Erodes Witness Confrontation Requirement

This case was straight out of Detroit.  Anthony Covington was lying next to his car at a gas station, shot in the stomach, bleeding out, but still alive and speaking with the Detroit Police.

Just before he died, he identified Rick Bryant as his shooter.  Bryant's subsequent conviction, based largely on the dying man's identification, went all the way to the SCOTUS and was decided last month.

Conviction affirmed; and in the process, one of the many exceptions to the hearsay rule is broadly expanded at the expense of accused persons everywhere.

The 6-2 decision in Michigan v Bryant erodes the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment requiring that all witnesses against an accused be brought to court.  Surprisingly, Justice Sotomayor wrote for the majority; Justice Giinsburg recused herself; and just as surprisingly, Justice Scalia wrote in dissent.

This case is significant to the extent that it allows police officers to testify at a trial about what an out-of-court (i.e. hearsay) witness said when that witness is no longer available for purposes of cross-examination and in-court confrontation.  Whether a dying man's declaration comes into evidence at a criminal trial depends on the "testimonial" nature of his utterance.

Prior SCOTUS decisions have addressed this problem.  Until now, two domestic violence cases established each end of the continuum.

In the well-known case of Davis v Washington, the declarant's statment -made during a 911 call- was admitted because the emergency was ongoing when the statement was made.  The presence of the emergency made the statement non-testimonial and thus, admissible in court even though the declarant was not present at the trial.

On the other hand, when a statement is made after the emergency is extinguished, as in Hammond v Indiana, then such a statement is clearly testimonial; that witness must be brought into court, or the statement is excluded from trial.  The witness in Hammond made her statement from the safety of her home during a subsequent police visit. 

The Bryant Court constructs a complicated two-perspective test to determine the "testimonial" nature of a dying man's declaration.  A reviewing court must now consider both the declarant's primary purpose in uttering the statement, along with the recipient's purpose in receiving the statement.  Say what??

Writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia, not usually a champion for the defense but an ardent supporter of the confrontation clause, thinks the question "is an absurdly easy one".  The murder victim from Detroit, in his last breath, was telling the Detroit Police who shot him so they could apprehend the shooter; not to stop any "emergency".  Therefore, the statement was testimonial in nature and should not be admissible in court according to Scalia's analysis.

Seems like each year SCOTUS issues at least one decision from Detroit and the surrounding area that has a local murder at issue.  Last year it was Warden Berguhis v Thompkins; this year it's Rick Bryant's case.

Kinda sad that we're known for the laws that get spawned from these murders.

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Posted in: confrontation clause,Detroit,Detroit Police Department,evidence,hearsay evidence,Justice Antonin Scalia,Justice Sonia Sotomayor,SCOTUS,Sixth Amendment,statement,witness