Showing posts with label privacy law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label privacy law. Show all posts

Saturday, January 12, 2013

Michigan's Internet Privacy Protection Act & Social Media

On the last business day of calendar 2012, Governor Snyder signed the Internet Privacy Protection Act.  With that stroke of the Governor's pen, Michigan joins just 3 other states [California, Maryland and Illinois] to enact sweeping employment legislation designed to protect employees' and students' social media accounts.

This law affects all employers, regardless of size, and also applies to public and private schools.  The IPPA prohibits employers or schools from requiring applicants to disclose their password or login information as a condition for admission, hiring or discipline.

Technically, employers and schools are prohibited from accessing a subject's "personal internet account", which is defined in the statute as:
an account created via a bounded system established by an internet-based service that requires a user to input or store access information via an electronic device to view, create, utilize, or edit the user’s account information, profile, display, communications, or stored data.
This definition covers just about every social media account you can think of; and then some.  Arguably, the IPPA applies to all employee's internet accounts of any kind; not just social media accounts.

However, there are broad exceptions to what is out-of-bounds for employers.  For example,
  • Employers can still access devices owned by the employer as well as the data stored on such devices; 
  • Accounts created by the employer and used for the employer's business purpose; 
  • Employers can discipline employees that transfer data owned by the employer onto that employee's personal internet account;
  • Employers can access personal accounts when necessary to conduct an investigation for the purpose of complying with laws; 
  • Employers can access personal accounts when conducting an investigation into work-related conduct, and 
  • Employers can still access any information about an employee or applicant that is available on the Internet without the use of a password or login information.
One interesting context within which the new Act will likely get some early play is in the workmen's compensation arena.  It is nothing new for insurance adjusters to track the activities of injured employees on social media sites.  The IPPA may supply an avenue of protection for employees who have had a post on Facebook taken out of context.

The Act also bars an employer from "shoulder surfing" the employee; the practice of monitoring an employee's social media site by directing the employee to log onto the site so the manager can observe recent posts.

Nor can an employer require an employee to disclose information from which the employer can then access the employee's personal internet account.

Violation of the IPPA subjects an employer to a misdemeanor conviction and a fine of $1000 as well as other civil penalties.  Violators are also subject to paying the employee's attorney fees.

www.clarkstonlegal.com
info@clarkstonlegal.com

Thursday, August 2, 2012

Illinois is 3rd State to Legislate Social Media Privacy Law

This just in.  Illinois joins Maryland and Delaware to pass a law protecting the social media privacy of individuals from prospective employers.

Michigan also has a similar bill under consideration known as the Social Network Account Privacy Act.  The general concept of these laws is to proscribe employers or educational institutions from requiring prospects to provide account access data such as passwords or log-in information.

Many of these prospective employers are law enforcement agencies, perhaps looking to see whether their recruits have any gang connections.  Other employers seek inappropriate photos are company disparaging remarks.

This practice is widely regarded as a breach of privacy.  Further, it is a breach of the operating agreement for most sites to share a password.  While the Justice Department considers the practice of entering a social media site in violation of the site's agreement to be a federal crime; albeit, the JOD has admitted in recent congressional testimony that such crimes will, for now, go un-prosecuted.

These laws are considered by legal experts to be both pro-business and pro-privacy.  The benefits to our ever-eroding privacy are obvious.  As for business, such legislation relieves a company or educational institution from the duty of monitoring protected digital content.

We will monitor the bill currently pending in the House Committee on Energy and Technology.

www.clarkstonlegal.com

info@clarkstonlegal.com

Thursday, June 7, 2012

Oakland Circuit's Spousal Computer Privacy Case Rejected by Supreme Court

Leon Walker with his former
spouse in happier times
There is an interesting privacy law criminal case percolating through the appeals courts that originated here in Oakland County.  The case involves the alleged hacking access by a husband of his former wife's computer.

Last Friday, the Michigan Supreme Court denied Leon Walker's application for leave to further appeal from a Michigan Court of Appeals order that similarly rejected his effort to quash the criminal information filed in his case.


On appeal, Walker's lawyers have asserted that the legislature did not intend to criminalize the domestic relations nature of his conduct.  Also, although Walker did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute, he simply asserted that the evidence adduced by the prosecutor at the preliminary examination did not comport with the proscribed conduct set forth in the statute.

The case now goes back down to Oakland Circuit Judge Martha Anderson for further proceedings and trial.

Back in 2009, Walker suspected his wife was having an affair.  Employed as a computer technician for Oakland County, he had expertise on how to access computers.  Allegedly, he hacked into a computer that the prosecutor alleges had been gifted to his wife, discovering evidence of the affair.

This blog covered the case in an earlier post when the matter seemed to be heading for trial.

In speaking with Mr. Walker yesterday [he contacted our law firm], he said he is looking forward to his trial when all the facts will come out before a jury.  Among those facts, he says the laptop computer at issue in the case was premarital and that he never gifted it to his former wife.

Walker also claims that the Oakland County Sheriff, or their computer expert, may be responsible for evidence spoilation; they claim to have lost or misplaced his laptop.

Although the Supreme Court declined to decide the case at this time, some of the Justices hinted at their concern that the language in the statute is very broad and could be used to criminalize otherwise legal conduct.

Justice Marilyn Kelly, who voted to hear the appeal, stated her concern in the High Court's order:
The factual basis for one of the charges against defendant is that he allegedly accessed his wife’s e-mail account without her permission.   This may be the first time in the 33 years since MCL 752.795 became law and the 16 years since it was amended to its present form that the statute has been used as the basis for criminal charges for the behavior in question. 
Justice Kelly goes on to note that the Michigan legislature submitted a bill to the House Judiciary Committee last year seeking to amend the unauthorized computer access statute.  This bill would carve-out an express exception in the statute for spouses, provided that certain conditions were satisfied.

We will be keeping an eye on this hot case.

www.clarkstonlegal.com

info@clarkstonlegal.com



Tuesday, April 17, 2012

Privacy and Tracking Cell Phone Use

Our cell phones have been described as the biographer of our daily lives.  If deconstructed, a cell phone can tell an awful lot about its owner.

Increasingly, cell phone carriers are being subpoenaed in high-conflict, or fault-based divorce cases.  The cell phone records identify the persons with whom an individual communicates throughout the day, and where that communication occurred.

The information contained in cell phones is also important in the law enforcement context.  Formerly reserved for federal agents, local law enforcement is now getting in on this information bonanza thanks to a smorgasboard of services provided by cell phone carriers.

The legal question posed by the practice is whether local police departments must obtain a probable cause-based warrant prior to securing our cell phone information from our carrier.  The answer is unclear.

Recently, SCOTUS decided United States v Jones, requiring a warrant prior to installing a GPS tracking device on a drug suspect's vehicle.  The decision in Jones did not address whether a warrant is needed in the case of obtaining cell phone records; including the geographic information in the now-ubiquitous GPS navigation systems embedded in cell phones.

In addition to geo-tracking data, there is also "cloning": having a cell phone, for example, download [to police] copies of sent and received texts.

This information is deemed so important to law enforcement agencies, some are by-passing the cell phone carriers altogether, purchasing their own cell phone tracking equipment in order to avoid the cost and delay of dealing directly with the various carriers.  In February, police in Grand Rapids, for example, were able to track a cell phone call placed by a stabbing victim who had been secreted away in a basement.

At present, however, there are few guidelines for cell carriers and the disparate local police agencies as to what information can be provided, and what evidentiary standard must be met in such disclosures.

With the SCOTUS decision in Jones less than clear, and with the federal circuit courts of appeal divided on the issue, Congress and the state legislatures are looking at the issue.  Privacy law is going to be a growing branch of our jurisprudence in the next few decades.

www.clarkstonlegal.com

info@clarkstonlegal.com

Tuesday, March 6, 2012

What Happens to Frozen Embryos After A Divorce?

In happier times, the Stratfords, Jude and Jayane, did what an increasing number of marital couples are doing; they froze one of Jayane's eggs that had been fertilized by Jude's sperm; i.e. they cryopreserved an embryo.  When the dust settled in their subsequent St. Clair County divorce proceeding, the now-divorced couple realized they had forgotten to address their frozen embryo in the consent judgment of divorce.

Jude went back to the family court seeking permission to allow an anonymous couple to utilize the single fertilized and frozen egg.  Jayane objected, asserting her desire to donate the embryos for research.

After carefully balancing the respective interests of the parties following an evidentiary hearing, St. Clair County Family Court Judge Elwood Brown concluded that Jude held a "superior interest" in the embryo, and promulgated a thoroughly-researched opinion and order on this ground-breaking topic that has no precedent in Michigan's statutory or common law.

Judge Brown ruled that: "[Father] may provide for the embryo to be donated anonymously by the fertility clinic for the purpose of adoption by another willing couple."  Jayane appealed Brown's ruling to the Michigan Court of Appeals.

The MCOA reversed the family court in an unpublished and thus non-binding per curiam decision, holding that the lower court erred by obligating the fertility clinic, not a party to the Statford divorce, and further held that the family court order was too vague relative to Father's right/duty to donate the fertilized egg to another "willing couple".

The appellate court was particularly troubled by the lack of a contract between the divorced parties and the fertility clinic.  Addressing the family court's creation of duties to a non-party, the MCOA stated:

Aside from the permissive nature of the order, the order imposed upon the clinic several obligations that the clinic may be unwilling to accept or unable to perform.  For example, the record does not indicate whether the clinic is able to make the embryo available for adoption.  Similarly, the record contains nothing to demonstrate that the clinic is willing or able to accept the order’s apparent restriction that the embryo be adopted only by a willing couple.  In addition, the record does not identify who, if anyone, is currently paying for any of the clinic’s costs arising from cryogenic preservation until a “willing couple” is available for adoption.  We are further left to assume from this record that there is preservation in fact, viability, and, non-abandonment of the embryo.  Moreoever, in the event plaintiff opts not to donate the embryo, the record does not indicate whether the clinic is willing or able to continue to preserve the embryo indefinitely.

In so ruling, the MCOA compared the Statford's circumstances with an earlier "zygote" case from 1999, Bohn v Ann Arbor Fertility Clinic, which involved a similar family court "custody" dispute, along with a companion "breach of contract" cause of action.

In each case, the Court of Appeals focused on the agreement, or lack thereof, between the biological donors and the fertility clinic.  In deciding each case, the MCOA emphasized the poor quality of the lower court record relative to upholding the plaintiff's claims or, in the Stratford case, the lower court's rationale.

Nor did the Stratford panel endorse the lower court's "balance of interests test", ruling that such was within the purview of the legislature and not the courts.  We here at the Law Blogger heartily agree.

Stay tuned to see whether either party applies for leave to further appeal or whether there will be additional proceedings in the family court.

Also stay tuned to see whether our state legislature passes legislation to address the proprietary rights of zygotes, oocytes, and other pre-embryonic cells.



www.clarkstonlegal.com

info@clarkstonlegal.com

Saturday, March 3, 2012

Google's Privacy Policy Gets Look From Attorneys General

By now we've all been shocked by how much information the major search engines collect and store about each of us. The reach now extends into our cell phones and possibly even into our contacts.

On March 1st, Google implemented a new, single privacy policy, replacing it's patchwork of more than 50 separate policies spread across its product line and services. In the wake of Google's new privacy policy, the Attorneys General in a majority of states are calling foul.

Speaking for at least 35 state attorneys general, the National Association of Attorneys General complains that the new policy violates consumers' privacy by sharing personal information across Google's services without providing an explicit "opt in" or a meaningful "opt out" option.  NAAG sent a letter to Google's Chief Executive Officer, Larry Paige, requesting a sit down.  The NAAG letter states, in part:
Google’s new privacy policy is troubling for a number of reasons. On a fundamental level, the policy appears to invade consumer privacy by automatically sharing personal information consumers input into one Google product with all Google products. Consumers have diverse interests and concerns, and may want the information in their Web History to be kept separate from the information they exchange via Gmail. Likewise, consumers may be comfortable with Google knowing their Search queries but not with it knowing their whereabouts, yet the new privacy policy appears to give them no choice in the matter, further invading their privacy. It rings hollow to call their ability to exit the Google products ecosystem a “choice” in an Internet economy where the clear majority of all Internet users use – and frequently rely on – at least one Google product on a regular basis. 
For its part, Google claims the new policy will be easier for all to understand.  For our part, this Blog adheres to a simple basic principle: when conducting search and post activities on line, we keep in mind that we are creating a searchable and reviewable record.

Everyone seems to know the difference between posting content on sites like Google+ and YouTube and having their deepest darkest searches tracked.  In the former context, the user usually intends for the content to be discovered.  For example, we here at this blog wish our Clarkston Legal video on YouTube had more than 45 views in two years; my son thinks that's lame.

In the latter context, on the other hand, folks are sometimes embarrassed by what pops-up in the form of advertisements that the mighty and all-powerful web spider has determined to be relevant to a particular individual.  Such ads are displayed based on the aggregated content and personal information collected by the service provider.

This chapter just lets us know that privacy law is a fast-growing area of law that will take on increasing significance.  Stay tuned for the flow of developments as the lawsuits start to pile-up.

www.clarkstonlegal.com

info@clarkstonlegal.com

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