SCOTUS to Hear Michigan Case on Plea Bargain Process

This week I had a 3-day jury trial. When it was completed, I walked out of the courthouse but my client did not.

In such criminal cases, at the brink of trial, it is common that the plea discussions give an accused serious pause. Rejection of a reasonable plea offer can result in significantly more time in prison thus, the stakes are high.

The counsel-driven plea process is at the heart of a Michigan case up for oral argument this week at SCOTUS: Lafler v Cooper. The case comes from the Wayne County Circuit Court; straight out of the Frank Murphy Hall of Justice.

The female victim in the case was shot 4-times by Anthony Cooper: twice in the buttocks, once in the abdomen, and once in the hip.  She survived these gunshot wounds.

Cooper's lawyer rejected a plea offer that would have capped his prison term to the lower end of his sentencing guidelines on an attempted murder charge.  The offer was rejected on grounds that the medical evidence in the case would demonstrate that Cooper was only trying to maim his victim; not kill her.  Counsel pushed for a reduction of the charges to assault with intent to do great bodily harm.

Well, as I've learned over the past two decades: "good luck with that..."

After his jury trial conviction, Mr. Cooper was sentenced to 135-360 months in prison.  On appeal, he raised a claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargain phase of his case in contravention of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

With his appeals exhausted in the state courts, Cooper filed a petition for Habeas Corpus in federal court.  The federal court ruled that the state appellate court erred by not accounting for the "affirmatively deficient advice" of Cooper's trial counsel in rejecting the prosecutor's initial plea offer.

The remedy: the federal court ordered specific performance of the initial plea offer: i.e. a 50-month prison term.  Understandably, the prosecutor appealed hence, the case now resides on the SCOTUS docket.

We will keep an eye on this one for you as it implicates how defense counsel handles the all-important plea bargain process.  So stay tuned...

http://www.waterfordlegal.com/

info@waterfordlegal.com

Read more »

Posted in: criminal defense lawyer,effective assistance,Frank Murphy Hall of Justice,habeas corpus,SCOTUS,Wayne County Circuit Court

Has Accused's Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Been Expanded by SCOTUS?

Since 2009, I have served as a roster attorney for the Michigan Appellate Assigned Counsel System (MAACS). While a MAACS roster attorney hones his knowledge of the many facets of criminal law in the appeal context, most assignments involve assessment of yet another guilty plea appeal. No glory in that, to be sure.

Many of the guilty-plea appeals involve the Sixth Amendment issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Often, youthful offenders claim they are forced by trial counsel to "take a deal" that they later regret. Rarely do these claims have merit. In almost every case, the Michigan Court of Appeals is not persuaded that the accused youth tendered anything but a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.

The mantra of the trial court taking the plea comes to mind: "Are you pleading guilty here today because you are guilty of this offense?"  The accused, sheepishly, states in the affirmative.

Last year, however, the SCOTUS decided Padilla v Kentucky. The case reversed the conviction of a legal immigrant on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel where the accused was not properly and fully advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.  Padilla was told not to worry about deportation because he had been in the country so long.

The Padilla case has drawn much attention among scholars of the criminal law; not for its immigration component, but for how it has expanded the scope of a lawyers duty to advise their clients of all the myriad consequences associated with their plea.

These consequences go far beyond the mere risk of incarceration and fines.  The potential "collateral" consequences could an individual's right to obtain a loan, obtain insurance benefits, bear arms, to vote, serve on a jury, serve as a foster parent, to participate in particular professions, terminate pension benefits, determine where a person can live, result in the loss of child custody, and in the case of sex crimes, doom the individual to a near lifetime of onerous registration requirements.  This is but a partial listing of the potential consequences.

Difficulties certainly arise for the lawyer facing her client's guilty plea.  The collateral consequences associated with the plea are often scattered across the Michigan Penal Code, and the federal statutes.

Defense counsel is often oblivious to this trap-laden universe.  The courts are wholly unconcerned with consequences to a plea that they do not impose.  For their part, prosecutors are not troubled with matters outside their direct control.

Add to this the fact that Michigan's court-appointed defense counsel advises the accused on nearly a pro-bono basis, and you have the makings for a constitutional catastrophe; or at least an imminent collision with the Padilla holding.

In the Internet-Age, as the number of people with criminal records have increased, so has the ability of employers, educators, lenders, and landlords to gain direct access to those records.  This makes obtaining legal advise as to the collateral consequences of a guilty plea all the more compelling.

Lawyers will have to be sharper than ever as they ambulate across the minefield of the criminal case.  Keep your eyes wide open has always been a trait of the best criminal defense attorneys.

Related story in Sunday NYT:  No sooner was this post uploaded when the Times published a story on the problem with monitoring people that once had the right to carry a weapon, but lost that right due to a felony conviction.

www.clarkstonlegal.com

info@clarkstonlegal.com

Read more »

Posted in: criminal defense,effective assistance,immigration,MAACS,Padilla v Kentucky,SCOTUS,Sixth Amendment